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ABSTRACT

In this Article, the Author undertakes a comprehensive
study of interim measures ordered in human rights cases before
six internationalenforcement bodies-the InternationalCourt of
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, the United Nations Committee against
Torture, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. An order of interim measures may require that the
State take positive action, such as providing protection for
human rights activists or journalists, or it may call upon the
State to refrain from taking action, such as not extraditing a
person or delaying the execution of prisoners until their cases
have been resolved before the internationalbody. The purpose
of interim measures in internationalhuman rights law is most
often to protect persons involved in a case from urgent danger of
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grave and irreparable injury. The Author concludes that the
multiple jurisdictions charged with the enforcement of
internationalnorms are successfully harmonizing and evolving
their treatment of interim measures. In general, States have
accepted the decisions of international courts that interim
measures are binding on the States that are parties to the
applicable treaties. Many States have not yet accepted the view
that interim measures specified by internationalquasi-judicial
bodies also are binding on States. The Author argues inter alia
that States that have accepted the right of individuals to
petition internationalhuman rights bodies are bound to respect
that petition process by refraining from interfering with the
process and by protecting the lives and rights of those involved
in the case. Thus, interim measures are implied in the
constituent documents that provide for the right of individual
petition and must be considered to be binding on States that are
parties.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.
III.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................
INTERIM MEASURES IN GENERAL ................................
AUTHORITY TO ORDER INTERIM MEASURES ..................

A.
B.
C.
IV.

Urgency and Gravity .........................................
Likelihood of IrreparableInjury .......................

BINDING NATURE OF INTERIM MEASURES ...................

A.
B.
VI.

9
11

11
13
14

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ORDERING
16
INTERIM M EASURES ..................................................

A.
B.
V.

Express Authority ..............................................
Inherent Authority .............................................
Implied Authority ..............................................

3

Internationaland Regional Tribunals.............
InternationalQuasi-JudicialBodies ................

16
18
20
20
23

CIRCUMSTANCES REPEATEDLY GIVING RISE
. 26
TO INTERIM M EASURES ................................................

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

PendingState-Sponsored Executions ...............
Extraditionor Deportment................................
Protectionof Petitioners,Witnesses, and
N ationalA ttorneys............................................. .
Protectionof Human Rights Organizations,
Activists, and Journalists.................................
Protectionfor Local Judges and Opposition
P oliticians ..........................................................
Protectionto Allow DisplacedPersons
to Return to Their Homes ..................................
Medical Assistance to Prisoners........................

26
27
28
30
32
33
34

20051
VII.

INTERIM MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMPARATIVE PROCEDURES ..........................................

A.

B.
C.
D.
E.

VIII.
IX.
X.

PartiesAuthorized to Petition an
InternationalBody to Order
Interim M easures...............................................
PrimaFacieJurisdiction..................................
Discretionto OrderInterim Measures..............
PriorH earing.....................................................
The Periodof Effectiveness of Interim
M easures ............................................................

OVERSIGHT OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERIM
M EASURES ....................................................................
STATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERIM MEASURES ............
CONCLUSION .................................................................

3

35

36
38
38
39
40
44
45
48

I. INTRODUCTION

When the well-known Guatemalan newspaper El Peri6dico
published articles critical of the government, several of the
newspaper's investigative reporters and staff received death threats.1
The president of the paper was forced to leave Guatemala after his
home was taken over and his family harassed by armed persons who
identified themselves as National Police agents.2 Two armed men
entered the newspaper facilities, opened fire, and wounded a security
agent.3 In response to a complaint of human rights abuse filed with
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission
ordered the government of Guatemala to take interim measures to
protect the director and the technical and administrative staff of the
newspaper. 4 This immediate step protected the persons in danger
during the time-consuming international proceedings.
The overriding importance of interim measures in human rights
cases arises from their potential to terminate abuse rather than
primarily to compensate the victim or the victim's family after the
fact. International proceedings, which typically are not resolved for
years, are inadequate in urgent circumstances to protect persons from
imminent danger or death. There is, however, one procedural weapon

1.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.N./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1, 42 (Dec. 29, 2003),
available at http://www.cidh.org (describing El Periodico v. Guatemala).
2.
Id.

3.

Id.

4.
Interim measures are termed "precautionary measures" when issued by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

4
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in the arsenal of international tribunals and other quasi-judicial
enforcement bodies that has been effective in saving lives and
avoiding irreparable injury: an order to a State to take interim
measures.
An order of interim measures may require that the State take
positive action, such as providing protection for human rights
activists, journalists, or judges who have offended those in power.
Conversely, interim measures may call for the State to refrain from
taking action, such as not extraditing a person or delaying the
execution of prisoners until their cases have been resolved. The
purpose of interim measures in international human rights law is
most often to protect persons involved in a case from grave and
irreparable injury. Thus, in human rights cases, interim measures
are not only preventive but are also protective of human rights.5 The
authority to order a State to take interim measures is potentially one
of the most valuable powers possessed by international tribunals and
other enforcement bodies that deal with human rights issues. Their
protective function is more important than the compensatory function
of a final judgment.
The multiple jurisdictions charged with the enforcement of
international norms are successfully harmonizing and evolving their
treatment of interim measures.
International norms must be
interpreted consistently, and procedures must be applied in a similar
manner by the various enforcement bodies.
Inter-system
harmonization may come about when enforcement bodies, although
under no obligation to do so, choose to apply the reasoning or holdings
of other international bodies or to emulate the practice of other
systems. An excellent example is set forth in Mamatkulov and
Abdurasulovic, v. Turkey, in which the European Court of Human
Rights, in determining that interim measures are binding on the
parties to the European Convention, made reference to the
jurisprudence and rules of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (U.N. Human Rights Committee), and the
United Nations Committee against Torture (U.N. Committee against
Torture.) 6 The European Court stated in this regard that "the
[European] Convention must be interpreted so far as possible

5.
See, e.g., Peace Community of San Josy de Apartad6 (Colombia),
Provisional Measures, Order of June. 18, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 9 4 (2002),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr; La Nacion Newspaper (Costa Rica), Provisional
Measures, Order of Dec. 6, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
4 (2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr; Gallardo Rodriguez (Mexico), Provisional Measures, Order of
Dec. 6, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
4 (2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
6.
Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003), 99 39-51, availableat http://www.echr.coe.int.
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consistently with the other principles of International Law of which it
7
-an interpretation that advances the goal of interforms a part"Z
state harmonization of international law.
The treatment of interim measures has been harmonized
recently by the principal international and regional courts. In wellreasoned decisions, the ICJ,8 the European Court of Human Rights, 9
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' 0 have held that
interim measures are necessary to the effective functioning of the
tribunals and, thus, are binding. These decisions largely put to rest a
lengthy controversy as to whether an international tribunal's order
that a State take interim measures was binding or a mere suggestion
to be followed if the State chose to comply. Consensus has not yet
been reached on the equally important issue of whether interim
measures specified by international quasi-judicial treaty bodies, such
as the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the U.N. Committee against
Torture, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also
are binding on States. This Article argues that States that have
accepted the right' of individuals to petition international human
rights bodies are bound to respect that petition process by refraining
from interfering with the process and by protecting the lives and
rights of those involved in the case. Thus, interim measures are
implied in the constituent documents that provide for the right of
individual petition and must be considered to be binding on the states
parties to the treaties.
The increasing harmonization of the treatment of interim
measures in international law may minimize the concerns of some
commentators that the growing multiplicity of international fora
could result in inconsistent pronouncements on basic concepts and
potentially hamper international law's continuing evolution into a
coherent and harmonious body." Were the enforcement organs to
work in a vacuum without reciprocally recognizing and relying on
developments in the other bodies, international law could become
splintered and conflicting, and the" law would not be truly
"international." It is essential that the multiple international organs
make an effort to harmonize not only their holdings but also their

Id.
99 (citing A1-Adsani v. U.K., [GC], App. No. 35763/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
7.
2001-XI), § 60).
See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), available at
8.
http://www.icj-cij.org.
9.
See Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99
39-51.
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003),
See Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14,
10.
2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 14 (2000), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
See YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
11.
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 79 (2003). The goal of harmonization could become more
elusive because of the proliferation of international tribunals and other enforcement
bodies with overlapping jurisdiction.

6
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practice and procedures. As demonstrated by the harmonized intersystem rulings on interim measures, the multiplicity of international
fora can have a positive effect on international law. In a world-wide
system in which the tribunals and enforcement bodies look to the
interpretations of other fora, the most advanced, well-reasoned
decisions are finding acceptance and being adopted by other
international bodies, which spurs developing concepts and
procedures. 12 In this way the important pillars of evolution and
harmonization of international law are both being served.
The growing consensus that interim measures must be followed
by a State-not solely out of the State's goodwill but rather out of a
legal obligation-makes an inroad into the classical theory of
international law.
The classical or positivist view holds that
3
international law is derived from the voluntary will of the State.'
The State, in most cases, is only bound by international law when it
has ceded a particular aspect of its sovereignty by ratifying a treaty
or failing to object persistently to an evolving principle of
international law. 14 If the State ratifies a treaty, the positivist theory
provides that the State is only bound to the explicit provisions of the
treaty, and that it cannot be held to greater obligations than it has
expressly accepted. If the State also accepted the jurisdiction of an
international body with the authority to enforce the treaty, the
enforcement body must not infringe on any procedural protections
afforded the State or assert against it any rights to which the State

12.
See Christina Cerna, Do Multiple InternationalJurisdictions Strengthen or
Weaken International Law?: How the Inter-American System for the Protection of
Human Rights has Contributed to the Development of International Law, in
JURISDICTIONS

INTERNATIONALES;

COMPLEMENTARITE

OU CONCURRENCE? (6ditions

Bruylant, 2004) (arguing convincingly that the proliferation of bodies with overlapping
jurisdictions has resulted in the cross-fertilization of human rights norms and
practices). Cerna states that "a multiplicity of jurisdictions serves as a kind of peer
pressure among international adjudicatory human rights bodies. It is an engine for the
advancement of the international human rights movement. The more innovative
forum tends to push the more conservative forum forward by adopting more aggressive
tactics." Id. Cerna's argument is epitomized in the international treatment of interim
measures.
13.
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). The
Permanent Court of International Justice held in the Lotus Case that:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement
of common aims.
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
therefore be presumed.
Id.
14.

See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 10

(1991) (stating that
"consensualism").

international

law

is

dependent

on

"voluntarism"

or
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has not agreed. In this vein, States have argued that interim
measures are not binding on States when the authority to order such
measures is not included in the constituent document or when the
wording of the constituent document does not appear to be
mandatory. 15 Nonetheless, the major international tribunals have
held that interim measures are essential to the functioning of the
tribunal and that States have a legal obligation to comply with
interim measures regardless of whether the authority to order them
16
is expressed, inherent, or implied.
This development is especially important in human rights law
which, comparatively, has only recently been established as a
separate branch of international law. International human rights
law is an offshoot of traditional international law, which is based on
the principle of State sovereignty. 17 Human rights law, however,
undercuts certain foundational concepts of international law and
establishes the supremacy of human rights over the will of the State.
The purpose of international hurhan rights law is to protect
individuals from the misuse of power by the State or from the State's
failure to curb the misuse of power by entities or persons within the
State.' 8 Publicly ordered interim measures by an international body
bring attention to bear on abuses as they are happening and often
have the effect of curtailing those abuses. In this regard, interim
measures have been unexpectedly successful in the limited number of
cases in which they have been applied and may have a chilling effect
on similar abuses.
This Article represents a comprehensive study of interim
measures in multiple international fora including the ICJ, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human
Rights, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the U.N. Committee
against Torture, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.' 9 Although these international bodies may use different

15.
See TPS v. Canada, Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 24th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/24[D/99/1997 (2000).
See Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99
16.
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003); see also LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466
(June 27); Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14, 2000,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 14 (2000), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
See Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of
17.
IndividualsRather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
18.
To the extent that international cases heighten awareness of abuses that
have already taken place, they may deter similar abuses in the future.
19.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, G.A. res. 54/4, annex 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), art. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000), entered into force Dec. 22, 2000 (providing for interim
measures). Article 5 of the Protocol provides in part that:

8
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terminology to signify interim measures, the concept remains the
same. Interim measures may also be designated as "provisional
measures," "precautionary measures," "emergency measures," and
"conservatory measures." The term "interim measures" will be used
in this Article except when the source discussed employs an
alternative term. This multi-forum study of interim measures in
international human rights law argues that interim measures
ordered by any international body to which States have granted the
right to receive individual complaints must be considered to be
binding. This study will provide governments, non-governmental
organizations, and others litigating before international bodies with
an understanding of the application of interim measures in
appropriate circumstances. It will also inform the enforcement bodies
on the treatment of interim measures by the other international
tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies. Furthermore, it may encourage
the development and harmonization of other substantive rights and
procedures in international human rights law.
Part II of this Article discusses interim measures in general.
Part III evaluates the authority to order interim measures, including
express, inherent, and implied authority. The Author argues that
judicial organs have the inherent authority to order interim measures
and that quasi-judicial human rights bodies granted the competence
to review individual human rights complaints have the implied
authority to order interim measures.
Part IV delineates the
international standards for an order of interim measures: urgency,
gravity, and the likelihood of irreparable injury. Part V analyzes
whether interim measures should be binding when issued by all
international fora that have the right to consider individual petitions.
Part VI describes situations in which interim measures are most
commonly ordered, including pending State-sponsored executions;
extradition; protection of petitioners, witnesses, and human rights
activists; protection to allow displaced persons to return home; and
medical care for prisoners. Part VII compares the procedures applied
by the international bodies when considering provisional measure
requests. Part VIII discusses methods of implementation of interim
measures, and Part IX evaluates State compliance with interim
measures.

1)

Id. art. 5.

At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a
determination on the merits has been reached, the Committee may
transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent consideration a
request that the State Party take such interim measures as may be
necessary to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims of
the alleged violation.

20051
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II. INTERIM MEASURES IN GENERAL

Interim measures traditionally have been ordered to preserve
the subject matter of a dispute and, thus, maintain the status quo
until a tribunal reaches a judgment on the merits. 20 Their primary
purpose has been the preservation of the parties' rights pending a
court decision. 2 1 Thus, a party may be barred from logging a forest
that is the source of contention. On the international plane, interim
measures may be ordered by international courts, quasi-judicial
bodies, or arbitral bodies. 22 The International Court of Justice has
stated that the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures
"has as its object to preserve the respective rights of the parties
pending the decision of the Court, and presupposes that irreparable
prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of
The Permanent Court of
dispute in judicial proceedings. '2 3
International Justice earlier stated that "the parties to a case must
abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in
regard to the execution of the decision to be given, and, in general,
not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or
24
extend the dispute."
In addition to the traditionally preventive role of interim
measures, these measures are fundamentally protective of human
rights. 25 Although a State has an obligation, erga omnes, to protect

When interim measures are ordered by domestic courts, the orders
20.
generally are directed to the defendant to ensure that the property that is the subject
of the dispute is not disposed of prior to the court's decision. In U.S. courts, the
approximate equivalent of an order of interim measures is an interlocutoryinjunction
or a preliminary injunction. In Germany, orders to protect assets to allow future writs
of execution to be enforced are called "einstweilige Verfigung." Catherine Kessedjian,
Note on Provisional and Protective Measures in Private International Law and
Comparative Law, Hague Conference on Private International Law Enforcement of
Judgments (Oct. 1998), Prel. Doc. No. 10, at 24. See also CODIGO PROCESAL CML Y
COMERCIAL DE LA NACION, arts. 195-210 (1987) (Arg.); CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS
CIVILES DE CHILE, art. 280 (1983) (Chile); CODIGO DE PROCED[MIENTOS CIVILES DE
COSTA RICA, arts. 449-64 (1987) (Costa Rica); JEROME B. ELKIND, INTERIM PROTECTION,
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 26-28 (1981). Interim measures exist in most civil and
common law states.
See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 99, 103 (1973).
21.
See Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, International Centre
22.
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), R. 39. The study of interim measures
in arbitral or other trade-related proceedings is beyond the scope of this article.
23.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), Order of Sept. 1993, 35.
24.
See Electricity Company of Sofia & Bulgaria, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
79, at 199 (Dec. 5).
de Apartad6 (Colombia),
See, e.g., Peace Community of San Jos
25.
Provisional Measures, Order of June 18, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. (ser. E), 4 (2002);
Gallardo Rodriguez (Mexico), Provisional Measures, Order of Feb. 14, 2002, Inter-Am.

10
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all persons subject to its jurisdiction, international tribunals may
order States to take special measures to protect persons who are in
immediate danger of suffering irreparable injury. 26 A unique aspect
of international human rights cases is that individuals involved in
the case or even individuals related to those persons may be in
danger and, therefore, in need of the protection that can be offered
through interim measures. This need results from threats and
attempts to intimidate or eliminate complainants, their attorneys,
family members, and witnesses who have testified or have been called
to testify. Such threats and acts of aggression are intended to
interfere with the competence of the enforcement organ to hear all
evidence and may be meant to dissuade future complainants from
filing cases. The protection of all persons involved preserves the
court's ability to consider every aspect of the case and to reach a
conclusion based on all the evidence. The enforcement body must
have the authority to ensure that physical evidence or subject matter
not be injured or destroyed, as well as that same authority with
respect to those giving testimonial evidence. In this sense, as in
traditional cases, interim measures "prevent the Court from being
hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective rights
27
of the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved.
An order that a State take interim measures does not prejudge a
decision on the merits. 28 After ordering interim measures, the
international entity considers the evidence and determines whether
the State is liable for a human rights violation. When the U.N.
Human Rights Committee requests that a State take interim
measures, for instance, it informs the State that its request does not
imply that the Committee has made a determination as to the merits
of the petition. 29 Interim measures simply protect those involved in
the pending case.

Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (2002) 5; La Nacion Newspaper (Costa Rica), Provisional Measures,
Order of Dec. 6, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
4 (2001). At the drafting
conference of the American Convention, Costa Rica proposed that the Court be given
the power, common to all world tribunals, to act in serious and urgent situations.
Minutes of the Sixth Session of Committee II, Summary Version, November 20, 1969,
in THOMAS BUERGENTHAL AND ROBERT NORRis,
AMERICAN SYSTEM 214 (1993).

2 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE

INTER-

26.
See Peace Community of San Jos6 de Apartad6 (Colombia), Provisional
Measures, Order of June 18, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. (ser. E), 11 (2002).
27.
See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 102 (June 27).
28.
See Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Human
Rights Committee, R. 86, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/3IRev.6 (2001) [hereinafter UNHRC Rules
of Procedure]; see also Rules of Procedure, Committee against Torture, R. 108(2), U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/3/Rev.4 [hereinafter Committee against Torture, Rules of Procedure]; The
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, supra note 19, art. 5(2).
29.
UNHRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 86.

20051
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AUTHORITY TO ORDER INTERIM MEASURES

An international enforcement body, whether judicial or quasijudicial, that is empowered to consider individual complaints of
human rights abuse must have the authority to order a State to take
interim measures. This authority is essential to fulfill the purpose of
human rights treaties: the protection of persons. 30 A goal of the
enforcement bodies established by the treaties is to afford individual
complainants the procedural capability to enforce their rights.
Especially in human rights law, "[t]he final result of the international
procedure must have some practical relevance for the person
concerned. 3 1 To accomplish this goal, the tribunal must have the
legal authority to order provisional measures in any case in which
there will be immediate and irreparable damage to those involved in
the case in any capacity. This power is necessary for the effective
functioning of international human rights systems.
A. Express Authority
The authority to order interim measures may be expressly
provided for in the treaty, the constituent document that established
the tribunal or enforcement body. When authorization is set forth in
the constituent document, there is no question as to the organ's
competence to order interim measures. Treaties, such as the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, 32 the American Convention on
Human Rights, 3 3 and the Protocol to the African Charter 34 expressly
provide for interim measures. The Statute of the ICJ provides that
"[t]he Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be

30.
The Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American
Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75) Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82, Sept.
24, 1982, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 2,
29 (1982), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
31.
Rudolf Bernhardt, Interim Measures of Protection under the European
Convention on Human Rights, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS 102 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1994).
32.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 41, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ].
33.
American Convention on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.K/XVIII.1, doc. 65 rev. 1,
corr. 1, art. 63(2) (Nov. 22, 1969), available at http://www.oas.org [hereinafter
American Convention].
34.
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), art. 27(2) (June 9, 1998), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Protocol
to the African Charter].

12
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taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." 35 The InterAmerican Court's authority to order provisional measures, which is
provided for in the American Convention on Human Rights, is the
broadest in that it not only empowers the Court in particular
circumstances to "adopt such provisional measures as it deems
pertinent in matters it has under consideration" 36 but also authorizes
the Court to act at the request of the Inter-American Commission
even when a case has not yet been submitted to the Court. 37 As such,
the Inter-American system of human rights expanded the application
of provisional measures and adapted the doctrine and practice of
their use to the two-tiered system in the Americas. Likewise, the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which
establishes the African Court, provides that "in cases of extreme
gravity and urgency and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems
This provision partially echoes the American
necessary." 38
Convention.
Most enforcement bodies delineated their authority to order
interim measures in their self-drafted rules of procedure, either to
remedy the lack of a provision in the underlying treaty or to
For example, the
supplement the broad terms of the treaty.
European Rules of Court contain the sole authority for the adoption of
provisional measures in the European human rights system. 39 The
European Rules provide that a chamber of the Court may "indicate to
the party any interim measure which it considers should be adopted
in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the
proceedings before it."' 40 The wording of the Rules of Procedure of the
U.N. Human Rights Committee is less forceful in that it authorizes
the Commission to inform the State of the Commission's "views as to
whether interim measures may be desirable to avoid irreparable
damage to the victim of the alleged violation.' 4 1 Since States do not

35.
Statute of the ICJ, supra note 32, art. 41. Article 41(2) provides that
"[p]ending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given
to the parties and to the Security Council." Id. art. 41(2).
36.
American Convention, supra note 33, art. 63(2).
37.
Id. See JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 293-325 (2003).

Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 34, art. 27(a); see also VINCENT
38.
0. ORLU NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS LAWS, PRACTICE, AND
INSTITUTIONS 299-300 (2001) (supporting the notion that the Court may order
provisional measures in extreme circumstances).
39.
Rules of Court, European Court of Human Rights, Nov. 2003, R. 39,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int [hereinafter European Rules of Court].
40.
Id. R. 39(1).
41.
UNHRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 86. The Rules of Procedure
of the Committee against Torture provide that the Committee may request that the
State party "take such interim measures as the Committee considers necessary to
avoid irreparable damage to the victim or victims of alleged violations." Committee
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have the right of approval over the rules of procedure drafted by the
enforcement organ, they have argued that they should not be bound
by interim measures authorized solely by rules of procedure.4 2 In this
vein, Canada argued before the U.N. Committee against Torture that
[i]t must be observed that Rule 36 [regarding interim measures] has
only the status of a rule of procedure drawn up by the Commission....
In the absence of a provision in the Convention for interim measures an
indication given under Rule 36 cannot be considered to give rise to a
43
binding obligation on Contracting Parties.

B. Inherent Authority
The inherent authority of international tribunals to order States
to take interim measures is essential to the effective protection of
human rights. This inherent authority necessarily derives from the
powers accorded an international tribunal. Interim measures are
44
necessary if the tribunal is to exercise its competence effectively.
Whether an adjudicatory body has inherent authority to order
the State to take interim measures has been a subject of dispute. In
relation to the power of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
and subsequently the ICJ, experts argued that "[t]he judicial process
which is entrusted to the Court includes as one of its features, indeed
as one of its essential features, this power to indicate provisional
measures which ought to be taken.' '4 5
Scholars consider this
authority to be a general principle of international law and an
inherent part of the judicial function. 4 6 Although inherent power
may not be essential if there is a broadly worded provision granting
interim measures in the constituent document, such express
authorization may not cover all instances in which measures are

against Torture, Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 108(1). Finally, the Rules of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights provide that "[iun serious and urgent
cases, and whenever necessary according to the information available, the Commission
may, on itsown initiative or at the request of a party, request that the State concerned
adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons." Rules of
Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, entered into force on
May 1, 2001, amended at its 188th regular period of session, held from Oct. 7-24, 2003,
art. 25 [hereinafter Rules of Procedure Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.].
42.
See TPS v. Canada, Committee against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 24th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/24/D/99/1997,
8.2 (2000).
43.
Id.
44.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 782 (6th ed. 1990). "Inherent powers" are
defined in Black's Law Dictionaryas "powers over and beyond those explicitly granted
in the Constitution or reasonably to be implied from express grants .. " Id.
45.
ELKIND, supra note 20, at 162 (quoting MANLEY HUDSON, THE PERMANENT
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942; A TREATISE 426 (1943)).
46.
Id. (citing BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 267-76 (1953).
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necessary. The organ should not be unduly hampered by the wording
of the empowering document; rather, it must have the inherent power
to order interim measures whenever they are warranted by the
circumstances.
The Inter-American Court decreed its inherent authority to order
provisional measures in its first contentious cases. In the Honduran
Disappearancecases, the Court based this authority not only on the
American Convention, but also on its "character as a judicial body
and the powers that derive there from. ' 4 7 Buergenthal explained that
it may have been reliance on its inherited powers that permitted the
Inter-American Court to order Honduras to adopt measures to clarify
that every person enjoys the right to appear before the InterAmerican Commission and Inter-American Court, an instruction
which went beyond the strict parameters of the Convention
48
provision.
International recognition of the inherent authority of an
international tribunal to order interim measures is particularly
necessary when interim measures are not authorized in the
constituent document that established the enforcement entity. When
interim measures are authorized solely by a tribunal's rules of
procedure, their inherent nature is essential if the measures are to
have force. Thus, for instance, the European Court of Human
Rights 4 9 must rely on its inherent authority.
C. Implied Authority
Although there may be no express provision in the constituent
document authorizing interim measures, if such measures are
necessary for the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the treaty,
50
the authority to issue interim measures is implied in the treaty.
State parties to a treaty, like parties to a contractual obligation, make
a choice of forum when they accept the competence of an
international tribunal or quasi-judicial body to adjudicate disputes. If
the parties have neglected to include a term in the treaty or contract

47.
Godinez Cruz v. Honduras (Merits), Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 5,
47 (1989); Vel.squez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits),
Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, 45 (1988).

48.

See Thomas Buergenthal, Interim Measures in the Inter-American Court of

Human Rights, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 69, 83-84

(Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1994) (quoting Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits),
Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, 45(2) (1988)).
49.
European Rules of Court, supra note 39, R. 39.
50.

See,

e.g.,

UNIDROIT

PRINCIPLES

OF

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

CONTRACTS 1994, arts. 5.1, 5.2 (stating that contractual obligations may be express or
implied and that implied obligations arise from "(1) the nature and purpose of the
contract; (2) practices established between the parties and usages; (3) good faith and
fair dealing; (4) reasonableness").
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that is necessary to its nature and purpose, the forum chosen to settle
51
disputes relating to that agreement shall infer the necessary term.
Both express and implied terms are obligatory and binding on the
parties.
Quasi-judicial bodies such as the U.N. Human Rights
Committee, 52 the U.N. Committee against Torture,5 3 and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, whose express authority to
order interim measures is provided for only in their rules of
procedure, must rely on implied authority to order States to take
interim measures. The individual complaint procedure authorized by
States allows quasi-judicial organs to fulfil the object and purpose of
the treaty by considering individual human rights complaints
alleging State human rights violations. The right of individuals to
file human rights petitions with international bodies is defeated if the
petitioner is irreparably harmed before the merits of the petition can
be decided. The Inter-American Commission stated in this regard
that "in the Commission's view, OAS member states, by creating the
Commission and mandating it through the OAS Charter and the
Commission's Statute to promote the observance and protection of
human rights of the American peoples, have implicitly undertaken to
implement measures of this nature where they are essential to
preserving the Commission's mandate. '54 The U.N. Human Rights
Committee explained that interim measures 'are essential to the
Committee's role under the Protocol. '55 The Committee went on to
explain that "[fllouting of the rule, especially by irreversible measures
such as the execution of the alleged victim or his/her deportation from
the country, undermines the protection of Covenant rights through
the Optional Protocol. '56 The U.N. Committee against Torture has
also stated that "[c]ompliance with the provisional measures called
for by the Committee in cases it considers reasonable is essential in
order to protect the person in question from irreparable harm, which
could, moreover, nullify the end result of the proceedings before the
Committee. '5 7 The argument that interim measures are essential to

51.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981)
(stating that an omitted term "essential to a determination of their rights and duties"
will be supplied by the court).
52.
UNHRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 86.
53.
Committee against Torture, Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 108.
Annual Report Case 12.243, Report No. 52/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
54.
117 (describing Juan Raul Garza
OEA/ser.L.N./11.111, doc. 25, rev. 1255 (2000),
(United States).
55.
Piandiong et al., The Philippines, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 17th
5.4, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/70/D/869/1999 (2000). See Gine
Sess., Comm. No. 869/1999,
Naldi, Interim Measures in the UN Human Rights Committee, 53 ICLQ 445 (2004)
(analyzing the binding force of interim measures issued by the UNHRC).
56.
Id.
Views of the Committee against Torture under article 22 of the Convention
57.
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
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the competence granted to quasi-judicial enforcement bodies by the
States and that such measures are, therefore, implied in the
underlying treaty is compelling and necessary to the fabric of
international law.

IV. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ORDERING INTERIM MEASURES

The standard necessary for an international tribunal or other
body to order a State to take interim measures may vary depending
on the wording of the instrument authorizing the measures or the
jurisprudence of the enforcement body ordering them. In general, the
party requesting interim measures must demonstrate urgency and
the likelihood of irreparable injury. The Statute of the ICJ is general,
empowering the Court to indicate provisional measures "if it
considers that circumstances so require."5 8 The ICJ interprets the
phrase "circumstances so require" to mean that there must be
urgency and the likelihood of irreparable damage. 59 The American
Convention authorizes the Court to order provisional measures "[iun
cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid
irreparable damage to persons."6 0 The practice of the European
Court is to order interim measures when there is "imminent danger
to the applicant's life or of torture, or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."'61 If an enforcement body denies a request
for provisional measures because the requesting party cannot meet
the standards of gravity, urgency, and the likelihood of irreparable
damage, that party may make a subsequent request if the
62
circumstances of the case change.
A. Urgency and Gravity
The underlying situation must be sufficiently serious to satisfy
the requirement of gravity. The situation must also be urgent in that

8, U.N. Doe.
U.N. Committee Against Torture, 21st Sess., Comm. No. 110/1998,
CAT/C/21/D/110/1998 (1998).
Statute of the ICJ, supra note 32, art. 41; Leo Gross, The Case Concerning
58.
United States Diplomatic Consular Staff in Tehran: Phase of ProvisionalMeasures, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 395, 406 (1980); see also JERZY SZTUCKI, INTERIM MEASURES IN THE
HAGUE COURT: AN ATTEMPT AT SCRUTINY 61 (1983).
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v,Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 182, 201 (Dec.
59.

8).
American Convention, supra note 33, art. 63(2).
60.
See Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99
61.
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003), 55.
Rules of Court, International Court of Justice, art. 75(3) (1973) (amended
62.
2003) [hereinafter I.C.J. Rules of the Court]; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v.
Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, 13 (Sept. 11).
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the likelihood of irreparable injury is imminent. The ICJ found
sufficient gravity and urgency in the Nuclear Tests Cases, in which
Australia and New Zealand requested as interim measures that the
ICJ order France to cease atmospheric nuclear tests until the Court
had issued a judgment.6 3 Although France had not revealed a date
for further nuclear testing, there were reports that it intended to
start testing again that year. 64 France stated in this regard that it
would not agree to stop nuclear testing in the Pacific and that it
would continue the testing despite the protests of other States. 6 5 The
Court found that there was "an immediate possibility of a further
atmospheric test" resulting in urgency and, therefore, ordered the
French government to avoid atmospheric nuclear tests that could
66
result in radioactive fallout in Australia and New Zealand.
The international body must refuse to order interim measures
when the requisite urgency is not demonstrated.
In the case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant, the ICJ declined to order provisional
measures and nullify an arrest warrant because the requesting State,
the Congo, had not established that the situation was urgent. 6 7 A
domestic Belgian Court had issued an arrest warrant for the
Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was charged with inciting
ethnic violence through radio messages.6 8 The Congo requested
provisional measures arguing that it was necessary and urgent that
its Minister of Foreign Affairs be free to travel abroad without fear of
arrest. When the Congo restructured its government, however, and
shifted the person subject to the arrest warrant to a position that did
not require external travel, the Court did not find sufficient urgency
69
to order provisional measures.
The Inter-American Court did not find sufficient urgency to
order provisional measures to protect a Peruvian human rights
activist when Peru had not yet issued a warrant for his arrest.70 In
the Chipoco case, the Inter-American Commission requested that the
Court order Peru to adopt provisional measures to protect a Peruvian
human rights activist, Carlos Chipoco, who had cooperated with the

63.
See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 99 (1973); Nuclear Tests (N.Z.
v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 135 (1973).
64.
Nuclear Tests (Austl v. Fr.) 1973 I.CL.J. 99, 104.
65.
See id.
66.
Id. The ICJ did not find sufficient urgency in non-human-rights cases,
when Switzerland requested that the Court order the United States not to sell shares
in a company, and the United States had responded that it was not taking action on
the shares. Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1957 I.C.J. 122 (Oct. 24).
67.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 182, 201-02

(Dec. 8).
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 183.
Id. at 201-02.
Chipoco (Peru), Jan. 27, 1993, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) res. 1 (1993).
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Following Chipoco's involvement with the
Commission. 71
had
charged him with the crime of "justification of
Commission, Peru
terrorism against the state," which could result in the loss of
Peruvian nationality and twenty years in prison. 72 Although Chipoco
was in the United States when he was indicted, he could have been
tried in abstentia.73 The Inter-American Court refused to adopt
provisional measures finding that, since an arrest warrant for the
did not exist to
alleged victim had not been issued, the conditions
74
justify.the adoption of the requested measures.
In death penalty cases, when the date of execution is set and
approaching, the international body will find that the requisites of
gravity, urgency, and the likelihood of irreparable injury have been
met. If the date of execution has not been set, the adjudicating body
will look at the specific circumstances of the case to determine if
execution may be imminent. According to the International Court of
Justice, the lack of an execution date "is not per se a circumstance
that should preclude the Court from indicating provisional
measures." 75 The ICJ did order provisional measures to protect some
prisoners in the United States, finding that they were "at a risk of
execution in the coming months, or possibly even weeks," even though
the date of execution had not been set.76 In some States, imminent
danger may exist when a person has been tried and sentenced to
In
death, even though the date of the execution is unknown.
Staselovich v. Belarus, counsel for the petitioner explained to the
U.N. Human Rights Committee that in Belarus, death sentences are
carried out in secret without informing the prisoner or the family in
advance of the date. 77 In such cases the international human rights
body must order interim measures, if called for, when the sentence is
handed down.
B. Likelihood of IrreparableInjury
Interim measures are only appropriate when there is a likelihood
of irreparable injury. An injury is irreparable when there is no
remedy available at law that will adequately compensate for the
injury. The ICJ found that there was a likelihood of irreparable
injury and, therefore, ordered Iran to take provisional measures in

71.

Id.

1.

Id.
1-2.
72.
Id. 3.
73.
Id. res. 1.
74.
54
Avena and other Mexican nationals, (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 128,
75.
(Feb. 5).
Id. 55.
76.
Staselovich v. Belarus, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 77th Sess., Comm.
77.
No. 887/1999, 5.1, U.N. Doc. CCPRC/77/D/887/1999.
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the case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran78 after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran had been invaded and
U.S. citizens were being held hostage. 79 The Court found that the
situation "expose[d] the human beings concerned to privation,
hardship, anguish, and even danger to life and health and thus to a
serious possibility of irreparable harm. 80° Likewise, the ICJ found
the likelihood of irreparable injury in The Nuclear Test Cases even
though there was a lack of ascertainable damage attributable to
atmospheric nuclear testing.8 ' The Court relied on a United Nations
study that did not exclude the possibility that radioactive fallout on
82
Australia and New Zealand could cause irreparable damage.
Conversely, the ICJ declined to order provisional measures in the
case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, holding that there was no
possibility of irreparable damage.8 3 The Congo had requested that
the ICJ order Belgium to annul the warrant issued for the arrest of
its Minister of Foreign Affairs as a provisional measure because it
inflicted irreparable damage on the Congo. 8 4 The arrest warrant,
which had been transmitted to other states, could have subjected the
Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs to extradition to Belgium to
stand trial when he travelled while representing the Congo. When
the person in question became the Congolese Minister of Education,
the ICJ determined that the position did not require frequent travel
damage if
and that, therefore, the Congo would not suffer irreparable
85
annulled.
immediately
not
was
the arrest warrant
If the potential injury can be compensated by other means,
interim measures are not necessary. In the Aegean Sea case, the ICJ
refused to order Turkey to cease exploration and scientific research in
a continental shelf area that was claimed by both Greece and
Turkey. 86 The Court reasoned that reparations could be made "by
appropriate means" for the potential harm cited in the Greek
87
application.

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979
78.
I.C.J. 7, 20-21 (Order of Dec. 15).
Id. at 17-18.
79.
Id. at 20.
80.
See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 105; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.)
81.
1973 I.C.J. 141.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. V. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 105; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.)
82.
1973 I.C.J. 135, 141.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 182, 201 (Dec.
83.
8).
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, 11 (Sept. 11).
86.
87.
Id.
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V. BINDING NATURE OF INTERIM MEASURES

The inter-system harmonization of interim measures can be
observed in recent international tribunal holdings that interim
measures are binding on States. Decisions by the European Court of
Human Rights, the ICJ, and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights resolved the long-standing debate of whether interim
measures ordered by international tribunals are binding on States or
mere suggestions that States could follow out of goodwill. There is
currently, however, no international concurrence that interim
measures ordered by quasi-judicial bodies are binding.
A. Internationaland Regional Tribunals
It follows that if interim measures are authorized by the treaty
and inherent to the judicial duties of international courts, then they
must be binding on the parties that have accepted the Court's
jurisdiction.
The European Court of Human Rights held in
Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey that States must comply
with Court-ordered interim measures "and refrain from any act or
omission that will undermine the authority and effectiveness of the
final judgment.18 8 In Mamatkulov the European Court informed
Turkey that as interim measures it should delay extradition of the
applicants pending the Court's decision in the case.8 9 The applicants,
who were members of an Uzbek opposition party, were arrested in
Turkey pursuant to international arrest warrants charging them
with homicide and a terrorist attack against the President of
Uzbekistan. 90
The Republic of Uzbekistan requested their
extradition. 91 The applicants denied the charges and countered that
they were political dissidents working for the democratization of their
country and that political dissidents were being arrested and
subjected to torture in prison in Uzbekistan. 92 Although most States
voluntarily complied with European Court indications of interim
measures, Turkey did not. It extradited the applicants to Uzbekistan,
where they were imprisoned and denied access to the attorneys who
were representing them before the European Court. 93 The European
Court, relying on general principles of law and citing the
jurisprudence of several international courts and enforcement bodies,
held that Turkey's failure to comply with the Court's indication of

88.
See Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003), 110.
89.
Id. 109.
90.
Id.
13, 19.
91.
Id.
14, 19.
92.
Id.
17, 23.
93.
Id.
26, 28, 32.
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interim measures resulted in a breach of its obligations under the
European Convention. 94 The Court stated that a State Party must
comply with interim measures. 95 The Court clarified that when a
State ratifies a treaty and accepts the competence or jurisdiction of
the tribunal charged with the enforcement of the rights protected in
the treaty, the State must comply in good faith not only with the
substantive provisions96of the treaty but also with its procedural and
regulatory provisions.
The International Court of Justice held in the LaGrand Case
that its order of provisional measures was "binding in character and
created a legal obligation" and was "not a mere exhortation. '97 In
LaGrand, the ICJ held that the United States had not complied with
the Court's order of provisional measures when the State did not take
adequate steps to delay the execution of a German national. 98 The
ICJ had ordered the United States to "take all measures at its
disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand [was] not executed pending
the final decision" of the ICJ. The United States merely transmitted
the ICJ's order to the Governor of Arizona without comment,
explanation, or a plea for a temporary stay of execution. 99 Moreover,
when Germany brought suit in the U.S. Supreme Court to enforce the
ICJ order, the U.S. Solicitor General informed the Supreme Court in
a brief letter that "an order of the International Court of Justice
indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a
basis for judicial relief."'100 Th6 execution went forward as planned.
The ICJ then, for the first time, stated unequivocally that provisional
measures are binding on the State. 0 1 In doing so the Court reasoned
that the object and purpose of the ICJ Statute and the terms of the
article on provisional measures when read in context reveal that
the power to indicate provisional measures entails that such measures
should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the
necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid

Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99
94.
111. The European Court had previously held in the
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003),
Cruz Varas case that interim measures ordered by the European Commission were not
binding on the parties when there was no specific treaty provision granting such
powers. The Court reasoned that the power to order binding interim measures could
not be inferred from the Commission's Rules of Procedure. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 36 (1991).
See Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99
95.
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003), 110.
Id. 109.
96.
See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 110 (June 27).
97.
Id. 1 115.
98.
111.
99.
Id.
Id.
112. These responses on the part of the United States were held to be
100.
insufficient even considering the limited time in which the government had to act. Id.

110-12.
101.

Id.

112.
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prejudice to the rights of the parties as determined by the final
10 2
judgment of the Court.

The ICJ went on to explain that "[t]he contention that provisional
measures indicated under Article 41 might not be binding would be
10 3
contrary to the object and purpose of that Article."
The wording of the ICJ Statute that the Court has the power to
"indicate" provisional measures that "ought to be taken" was at one
time argued to imply that the Court's adoption of interim measures
was a mere suggestion to be complied with out of the goodwill of the
State. 0 4 The ICJ clarified that the Statute's preparatory work shows
that the French word for "indicate" was chosen rather than the word
10 5
for "order" because the ICJ had no means to enforce its decisions.
In LaGrand the Court specified that "the lack of means of execution
and the lack of binding force are two different matters."'1 6 The ICJ
found that the U.N. Charter requirement that every U.N. member
"undertakes to comply with the decision" of the ICJ should be
understood to refer to any decision rendered by the Court, including
an order that the State take provisional measures. 10 7 The Court
further stated that even if the word "decision" were to be interpreted
to refer solely to an ICJ judgment in the context of the article, it
10 8
would not preclude the binding nature of provisional measures.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was the first of the
international tribunals explicitly to hold that its provisional measures
orders are binding and mandatory.'0 9 In the Constitutional Court
case, in which judges of the Peruvian Constitutional Court had been
illegally removed from office, the Inter-American Court held that the
American Convention provision "makes it mandatory for the state to
1 10
It
adopt the provisional measures ordered by this Tribunal."
grounded its decision in "a basic principle of the law of international
state responsibility, supported by international jurisprudence,
according to which States must fulfil their conventional international
obligations in good faith (pacta sunt servanda)."111 In earlier orders

102.
Id.
103.
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2000 I.C.J. 466, 112 (June 27).
104.
See Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 32, art. 41; see also European Rules of
Court, supra note 39, R. 39(1); ELKIND, supra note 20, at 153-66 (noting different
approaches as to whether interim protection is binding).
105.
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 107 (June 27).
106.
Id.
107.
Id. at 505-06.
108.
Id. at 506.
109.
See Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14,
2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 14 (2000).
110.
Id.
111.
Id. The principle of pacta sunt servanda has been codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980.
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the Inter-American Court had merely implied that its orders of
provisional measures were mandatory, stating that "[s]tate parties
must not take any action that may frustrate the restitutio in integrum
of the rights of the alleged victims."1 1 2 That statement, although
forceful, did not definitively resolve the issue of whether provisional
measures were binding in the Inter-American system. The Court's
pronouncement in the Constitutional Court case is unequivocal,
permitting no measure of doubt as to the Court's resolution of this
113
question.
B. InternationalQuasi-JudicialBodies
The binding force of interim measures must not be limited solely
to tribunals. Even if a quasi-judicial body's decision on the merits of
a complaint arguably may not be binding on States, an interim
measures order must still have that effect. When contracting States
have authorized quasi-judicial treaty bodies to consider individual
applications, the States have obligated themselves implicitly not to
interfere with the processing of complaints. It would be incompatible
with the obligations voluntarily undertaken by the State for it to act
or refrain from acting in such a way as to frustrate the consideration
114
of an individual petition.
An order that a State take interim measures does not prejudge a
decision on the merits.11 5 It merely prevents destruction of the
subject matter of the dispute and protects those involved in bringing
the case before an international body. States must comply with
orders of interim measures to ensure the effectiveness of final
decisions on the merits of the case. 116 In many cases, especially those

112.
James et al. (Trinidad and Tobago), Provisional Measures, Order of May 27,
9 (1999); James et al. (Trinidad and Tobago),
1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 29, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 7 (1998).
Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14, 2000,
113.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
14 (2000). The Inter-American Court's decision that
provisional measures are binding is further supported by the wording and location in
the American Convention of the provision authorizing provisional measures. The
wording of the provisional measures article in the American Convention avoids the
controversial term "indicate." It states that the Court "shall adopt" the measures that
it deems pertinent-more forceful phrasing that goes beyond mere suggestion.
Article 63(2) of the American
American Convention, supra note 23, art. 63(2).
Convention is located in the chapter titled "Jurisdiction and Functions," thus
eliminating what was once a potent argument in the ICJ for the nonbinding nature of
the measures.
114.
See Piandiong et al. v. Philippines, UNHRC, Decision of Oct. 19, 2000,
Comm. No. 86911999, 5.1, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/701DI86911999.
115.
See UNHRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 86 (noting that the
Committee should inform the state party that its view on interim measures does not
imply a determination on the merits of the communication).
116.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. V. Yuge), Order of Sept. 1993, 35.
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cases involving the imminent execution of a prisoner, a final
judgment that the prisoner's due process rights had been violated and
that the prisoner should, therefore, receive a new trial would be
meaningless if the prisoner had already been executed.
The State breaches its commitment under the treaty if it ignores
an order of interim measures and, thereby, prevents or frustrates the
enforcement body from effectively considering an application or
complaint. 117 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
when requesting that the United States take "the urgent measures
necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay determined by a competent tribunal," 118 stated "where such
measures are considered essential to preserving the Commission's
very mandate under the OAS Charter, the Commission has ruled that
OAS member states are subject to an international legal obligation to
comply with a request for such measures." 119 When the Philippines
executed prisoners despite the U.N. Human Rights Committee's order
of interim measures to delay the executions, the Committee stated
that "a State party commits grave breaches of its obligations under
the Optional Protocol if it acts to prevent or frustrate consideration by
the Committee of a communication alleging a violation of the

117.
See Piandiong et al. v. Philippines, UNHRC, Decision of Oct. 19, 2000,
Comm. No. 869/1999,
5.1-5.2, U.N. Doc. CCPRICI70/D/869/1999.
118.
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba v. U.S., Decision of Mar. 12, 2002,
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., available at http://www.cidh.oas.org.
119.
Id. (citing Report No. 52/01, Case 55, 12.243, Juan Raul Garza (United
States), April 4, 2001, Inter-Am. C.H.R.). In Garza, the Commission stated:
With respect to the State's submissions on the non-binding nature of the
Commission's precautionary measures, the Commission previously expressed
in this Report its profound concern regarding the fact that its ability to
effectively investigate and determine capital cases has frequently been
undermined when states have scheduled and proceeded with the execution of
condemned persons, despite the fact that those individuals have proceedings
pending before the Commission. It is for this reason that in capital cases the
Commission requests precautionary measures from states to stay a condemned
prisoner's execution until the Commission has had an opportunity to
investigate his or her claims. Moreover, in the Commission's view, OAS
member states, by creating the Commission and mandating it through the OAS
Charter and the Commission's Statute to promote the observance and
protection of human rights of the American peoples, have implicitly undertaken
to implement measures of this nature where they are essential to preserving
the Commission's mandate. Particularly in capital cases, the failure of a
member state to preserve a condemned prisoner's life pending review by the
Commission of his or her complaint emasculates the efficacy of the
Commission's process, deprives condemned persons of their right to petition in
the inter-American human rights system, and results in serious and
irreparable harm to those individuals, and accordingly is inconsistent with the
state's human rights obligations.
Report No. 52/01, Case 55, 12.243, Juan Raul Garza (United States), April 4, 2001,
Inter-Am. C.H.R.
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Covenant, or to render examination by the Committee moot and the
expression of its views nugatory and futile.' 20 The U.N. Human
Rights Committee also has stated that interim measure orders "are
essential to the Committee's rule under the Protocol" and that a
State's failure to comply with interim measures is a separate breach
of its treaty obligations. 121 The U.N. Committee against Torture cited
the State party's obligation to "cooperate with it in good faith" in
It reasoned that
following orders of provisional measures.
for by the
called
measures
provisional
"[c]ompliance with the
in order to
is
essential
Committee in cases it considers reasonable
could,
which
harm,
from
irreparable
question
person
in
protect the
the
before
the
proceedings
result
of
moreover, nullify the end
22
Committee."1

It is necessary to the functioning of quasi-judicial bodies charged
with the enforcement of human rights treaties that their orders of
interim measures be treated as binding. 12 3 When quasi-judicial
organs have responsibility for enforcement, there is often no further
recourse to protect the rights of the applicants. For example, there is
no tribunal that will reconsider a decision by the U.N. Human Rights
Committee or the U.N. Committee against Torture. Even in the
Inter-American system, which is two-tiered, recourse to the Court is
limited to cases against States that have expressly accepted its

jurisdiction. 124

The Inter-American Court has attempted to give

support to precautionary measures ordered by the Inter-American
Commission, by instituting a presumption that Court-ordered
provisional measures are necessary when the Commission previously
has ordered precautionary measures on its own authority that were

Piandiong et al. v. Philippines, UNHRC, Decision of Oct. 19, 2000, Comm.
120.
5.2, U.N. Doc. CCPRlCI701D!86911999. In another instance, the
No. 869/1999,
Human Rights Committee stated that "[t]he State party is also under an obligation to
avoid similar violations in the future, including by taking appropriate steps to ensure
that the Committee's requests for interim measures of protection will be respected."
Weiss v. Austria, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 77th Sess., Comm. No. 1086/2002,
11.1.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/771D/1086/2002 (2002).
121
See Piandiong et al. v. Philippines, UNHRC Decision of Oct. 19, 2000,
Comm. No. 869/1999, 5.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C170/D/869/1999.
Cecilia Rosana Ndfiez Chipana v. Venezuela, Decision of Nov. 10, 1998,
122.
Committee against Torture, Comm. No. 110/1998, 8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/21/D/110/1998.
123.
The U.N. Committee on Human Rights, which is charged under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the U.N.
Committee against Torture, charged with enforcement of the rights enshrined in the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Other Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights are quasijudicial organs.
124.
See Piandiong et al. v. Philippines, UNHRC, Judgment of Oct. 19, 2000,
5.2, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/70/D/869/1999; Detainees at
Comm. No. 869/1999,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba v. U.S., Judgment of Mar. 12, 2002, Inter-Am. C. H.R.; Cecilia
Rosana Ntfiez Chipana v. Venezuela, Judgment of Nov. 10, 1998, Committee against
Torture, Comm. No. 110/1998, 8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/21/D/1l0/1998.
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VI. CIRCUMSTANCES REPEATEDLY GIVING RISE TO INTERIM MEASURES

Certain factual circumstances, because of their urgent nature
and potential for irreparable harm, repeatedly give rise to interim
measures on the international plane. These circumstances may
involve death penalty cases; extradition or deportation cases wherein
the person will be extradited to a State in which he or she will likely
face cruel and inhuman treatment or death; threats to those who file
petitions or testify against the State in international proceedings;
threats or attacks against local human rights organizations, activists,
and journalists; threats or attacks against local judges or opposition
politicians; protection to allow displaced persons to return to their
homes; and requests for medical care to ill prisoners.
A. Pending State-Sponsored Executions
When a State has scheduled the execution of a prisoner,
irreparable danger to life is imminent. The ICJ, Inter-American
Commission and Court, European Court of Human Rights, and the
U.N. Human Rights Committee have ordered States, as interim
measures, to delay executions until proceedings before the
international body have been completed and it could be determined if
the prisoners' due process rights had been violated. The European
Court of Human Rights requested, as an interim measure, that
Turkey refrain from carrying out the death penalty in the case of the
leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party until the Court could examine
the merits of the prisoner's case. 126 Turkey complied with the order
and did not execute Abdullah Ocalan. 127 The Inter-American Court
ordered Trinidad and Tobago to delay the executions of several
prisoners on death row until their cases could be considered.' 28
Although the State executed two of the prisoners, it stayed the
executions of the other beneficiaries of the interim measures. 129 The
ICJ in the LaGrand Case, as described above, ordered the United

125.
Digna Ochoa y PlAcido et al., Order of Nov. 17, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. E), 6 (1999), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
126.
Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 4622/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003),
5, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (last visited September 30, 2004).
127.
Turkey Commutes Death Penalty on Ocalan, ISLAM ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2002),
at http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2002-10/03/article23.shtml (last visited
Sept. 30, 2004).
128.
James et al. (Trinidad and Tobago), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug.
16, 2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), operative 1 1 (2000).
129.
Id. T 4, 12.
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States to take provisional measures to protect the life of Walter
LaGrand, a German citizen, who was scheduled to be executed in
Arizona on the same day that Germany filed the request with the
Court.130 The United States did not comply with the ICJ's order of
provisional measures. The majority of cases in which the U.N.
Human Rights Committee has requested interim measures have
131
involved petitioners who had been sentenced to death.
B. Extraditionor Deportment
An international body may order interim measures to delay
extradition or deportment when the applicant could be subject to the
death penalty or cruel and inhumane treatment in the country to
which he is to be deported or in the State that has requested his
extradition. 13 2 The European Court of Human Rights, 133 the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, 134 and the U.N. Committee against
Torture 135 have ordered interim measures to delay extradition or
deportation. The greatest number of requests for interim measures
in the European system have arisen in attempts to block
extradition. 136 In the Soering case, the applicant, a German national,
faced charges of capital murder in Virginia, and the European
Commission requested that the Court indicate as interim measures
that the United Kingdom delay the extradition of Soering to the
United States while the proceedings were pending before the

130.
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104,
8-9 (Mar. 3), availableat
http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited October 1, 2004).
131.
Report by Martin Scheinin, Summary Record of the First Part (public) of
the 487th meeting, U.N. Committee Against Torture, 27th Sess.,
2, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/SR.487 (2003). See generally Staselovich v. Belarus, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, 77th Sess., Comm. No. 887/1999 (2003).
132.
See Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827199, 46951/99
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003), 55 (noting that requests for interim measures generally
concern a person's deportation or extradition to his or her country).
133.
See generally Soering v. U.K., App. No. 14038/88 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 7,
1989),
24, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (holding that the United Kingdom
would violate its obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms if it extradited the applicant); Cruz Varas
& others v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 20, 1991), 55, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (noting that the court granted requests for interim measures
in expulsion and extradition cases).
134.
Weiss v. Austria, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 77th Sess., Comm. No.
1086/2002, 1.2, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/77/D/1086/2002 (2002).
135.
Cecilia Rosana Nfiez Chipana v. Venezuela, Decision of Nov. 10, 1998,
Committee against Torture, Comm. No. 110/1998, § 8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/21/D/110/1998.
136.
See generally Thampibillai v. Netherlands, App. No. 61350/00 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (noting that the applicants
should not be expelled to Sri Lanka pending the Court's decision); Venkadajalasarma v.
Netherlands, App. No. 58510/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ (noting that the applicants should not be expelled to Sri Lanka
pending the Court's decision).
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European Court. 137 Although the Virginia prosecutor intended to
seek the death penalty, he assured the United Kingdom that at the
time of sentencing the appropriate Virginia authorities would inform
the court of the United Kingdom's concern that the death penalty not
be imposed or carried out.13 8 The prosecutor offered no further
assurances. 139 The United Kingdom complied with the European
Court's indication of interim measures and did not extradite the
applicant. 140
Conversely, Austria extradited a petitioner to the
United States before the U.N. Human Rights Committee could
address the petitioner's allegation that he would suffer irreparable
harm if extradited. The Committee held that in doing
so, Austria had
14 1
breached its obligations under the Optional Protocol.
C. Protection of Petitioners,Witnesses, and NationalAttorneys
Petitioners who file complaints with international bodies
alleging State responsibility for human rights abuses and the
witnesses and attorneys in those cases are often particularly
vulnerable to retaliatory measures by the State. Those who testify
about government-sponsored human rights abuses may be labelled
''enemies of the State" because their testimony sullies the State's
international reputation.
In addition, local attorneys who take
human rights cases may be as vulnerable to retaliation as their
clients.' 4 2 Interim measures may be the only effective means of
protecting victims, their family members, their attorneys, and
witnesses in international human rights cases.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have been in the forefront in
ordering provisional measures to protect those who petition or testify
before international bodies. The Inter-American Court has stated in
this regard that "it is the responsibility of the State to adopt security
measures to protect all those who are subject to its jurisdiction; this
obligation is even more evident as regards those who are involved in
proceedings before the supervisory organs of the American

137.

Soering v. U.K., App. No. 14038/88 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 7, 1989),

138.

Id.

139.

Id.

140.

Id.

3, 4.

20.
111.

141.
Weiss v. Austria, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 77th Sess., Comm. No.
1086/2002, 10.1, U.N. Doe. CCPRICI771DI108612002(2002).
142.
See Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1),
46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
No. OC-11/90, Aug. 10, 1990, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (Ser. A) No. 11,
32 (1990) (noting
that complainants have alleged that they were unable to obtain legal help because of a
general fear in the legal community).
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Convention."' 143 After witnesses in the Honduran Disappearance
Cases had been murdered, the Inter-American Court ordered the
Honduran government to take provisional measures to protect all
those who had testified or who had been summoned to testify. 144 The
Court ordered Honduras to
adopt concrete measures to make clear that the appearance of an
individual before the Inter-American Commission or Court of Human
Rights, under conditions authorized by the American Convention and
by the rules of procedure of both bodies, is a right enjoyed by every
individual and is recognized as such by Honduras as a party to the
Convention. 145

precautionary
Commission granted
The Inter-American
measures ordering Colombia to protect the lives of the executive
director and attorney of a Colombian human rights organization that
had filed several petitions and requests for precautionary measures
with the Inter-American Commission. 146 The beneficiaries of the
measures had received anonymous death threats. 147 Likewise, the
Commission granted precautionary measures to protect the members
of the Comisi6n Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz, a prominent
Columbian human rights organization that148had filed petitions of
human rights abuses before the Commission.
Situations in which the complainants or witnesses are in danger
of death or injury may also become problematic in the European
system with the influx of additional States, many of which had not
been governed by the rule of law. The African Court, when active,
will likely confront similar problems.

See Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14,
143.
9 (2000); Digna Ochoa y Pldcido et al. (Mexico),
2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. E),
Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 17, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 7 (1999).
Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits), Judgment of July 29, 1988,
144.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 1, 45; Godinez Cruz (Merits), Judgment of Jan. 20,
1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 5, 45 (1989).
145.
Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits), Judgment of July 29, 1988,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 1, 45; Godinez Cruz (Merits), Judgment of Jan. 20,
1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 5, 45 (1989).
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
146.
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1, 23 (Dec. 29, 2003),
availableat http://www.cidh.org (describing Fl6rez Schneider et al. v. Colombia).
147.
Id.
148.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1, 24 (Dec. 29, 2003),
available at http://www.cidh.org (describing Comisi6n Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz v.
Colombia).

30

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.'1

D. Protection of Human Rights Organizations,Activists, and
Journalists
Human rights activists may be threatened or persecuted locally
because of their human rights advocacy, and national courts may not
have the power to provide adequate protection. 149 These cases have
been particularly prevalent in the Inter-American human rights
system. The Inter-American Commission stated in its 2003 Annual
Report that the situation of human rights defenders in Guatemala
has progressively worsened. In recent years there has been an increase
in the number of threats, acts of harassment, searches of headquarters
of human rights organizations and homes of human rights defenders,
and assaults and assassinations targeting defenders. These actions are
part of a pattern of intimidation of human rights defenders, identifiable
by the profile of the victims, the methods of intimidation, and the
motives behind them. The main goal of this pattern of intimidation
against human rights defenders is to prevent effective action by the
judicial branch in cases of human rights violations committed during
the armed conflict. 1 5 0

Guatemala is not the only state in which human rights activists
are targeted and in need of the protection that interim measures can
offer. In Colombia, the president and attorney for a Colombian
human rights organization was assassinated even though the InterAmerican Commission had ordered the government to provide him
with protection as a precautionary measure. 151 The Inter-American
Court then ordered Colombia to take provisional measures to protect
the other human rights workers in the organization. 152 In Mexico,
the Inter-American Court ordered provisional measures after Digna
Ochoa, a human rights activist and attorney for a Mexican
nongovernmental organization, was kidnapped; other members were
threatened; and the office of the organization was ransacked. 153 The
Court ordered Mexico to adopt provisional measures to protect those

149.
Alvarez et al. (Colombia), Provisional Measures, Order of July 22, 1997,
Inter-Am. Court H.R. (ser. E) (1997); Giraldo Cardona et al. (Colombia), Order of Oct.
28, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (1996); Digna Ochoa y Pldcido et al. (Mexico),
Order of Nov. 17, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (1999).
150.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.V./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. IV, Guatemala,
37 (Dec. 29,
2003), available at http://www.cidh.org,
151.
Giraldo Cardona et al. (Colombia), Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 27,
1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), res. 1-2 (1998).
152.
Giraldo Cardona et al. (Colombia), Order of Oct. 28, 1996, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. E) (1996).
153.
Digna Ochoa y Pldcido et al. (Mexico), Provisional Measures, Order of Nov.
17, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 2 (1999).
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Although
working in or visiting the human rights center.15 4
provisional measures have not been consistently successful, in many
cases they have been instrumental in ending death threats and
preventing future harm to human rights advocates.
Newspapers, journalists, and television stations that report on
official transgressions or that are otherwise critical of the government
The Intermay be threatened and require interim measures.
American Commission noted in its 2003 Annual Report that there
was an "alarming increase in intimidations against the media" in
Guatemala. 155 For instance, Guatemalan journalist Maria de los
Angeles Monz6n Paredes and her family were threatened because of
her writing on crucial human rights issues. 15 6 As a result the InterAmerican Commission ordered the Guatemalan government to take
precautionary measures to protect her. 15 7 The Inter-American Court
also issued provisional measures to protect the lives and safety of
journalists who worked for the Venezuelan television station Radio
Caracas Televisi6n after one journalist was murdered and others had
been shot, beaten, or threatened. 58 The Inter-American Commission
likewise granted precautionary measures and ordered the
government of Haiti to protect a journalist and a radio correspondent
who had been subjected to death threats. 159 Freedom of the press is
essential to the protection of human rights, and interim measures
may provide one means to protect the lives of journalists who put
themselves at risk by writing accounts of human rights abuse.

154.
Id. res. 1-2; see also Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights 2003, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1,
11 (Dec. 29, 2003) (describing Jorge Custodio et al. v. Brazil, in which the coordinator
of a human rights NGO and his family had been subject to threats because of a report
on the torture of prison inmates that resulted in the replacement of prison officials);
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003, Inter-Am.
12 (Dec. 29, 2003)
C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1,
(discussing Gomes da Silva et al. v. Brazil, in which a member of an NGO against
torture had been kidnapped, held for several hours and threatened).
155.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.IV./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. IV, Guatemala, 41 (Dec. 29,
2003).
156.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
39 (Dec. 29, 2003)
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.N./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1,
(describing Maria de los Angeles Monz6n Paredes v. Guatemala).
157.
Id.
158.
Luisiana Rios et al. v. Venezuela, Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 27,
2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. E), 2, operative 1.
159.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.NV./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1, 52 (Dec. 29, 2003)
(describing Liliane Pierre-Paul et al. v. Haiti).
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E. Protectionfor Local Judges and Opposition Politicians
Local judges who rule against the government or against
powerful political factions may have need of the temporary protection
In the
offered by internationally mandated interim measures.
Chunimd Case, two Guatemalan judges who investigated the
murders of human rights activists and then issued arrest warrants
for the alleged perpetrators were threatened and forced into
hiding. 160 The Inter-American Court ordered Guatemala to protect
16 1
the judges as well as the members of the human rights group.
Likewise, the Inter-American Court ordered provisional measures
orders to protect a member of the Peruvian Constitutional Court who
had been dismissed and harassed after holding that a law allowing
President Fujimori to run for a third term of office was
unconstitutional. 16 2 Those measures were lifted when the beneficiary
was subsequently reinstated on the Court. 16 3 Similarly, the InterAmerican Commission ordered Guatemala to provide protection to
the members of the Constitutional Court who received death threats
when they were considering the registration of Rios Montt as a
presidential candidate. 164 In that case, one of the judges had to be
airlifted from his home when his building was taken over by Rios
Montt sympathizers. 1 65 Intimidation of the judiciary cannot be
allowed if human rights are to receive judicial protection. Interim
measures may protect judges and also provide negative publicity to
curtail the abuses.
Opposition political candidates may also be threatened or
murdered, thereby jeopardizing the political process. In the Aleman
Lacayo Case, the Inter-American Court originally ordered provisional
measures to protect a presidential candidate in Nicaragua whose
The
motorcade had been attacked by heavily armed men. 166
measures were lifted when the beneficiary of the measures was

160.
ChunimA Case (Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of the President
July 15, 1991, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 6 (1991).
ChunimA Case (Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 1, 1991,
161.
1, 2 (1991).
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14, 2000,
162.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 2, operative 1 (2001).
163.
Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Mar. 14, 2001,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 3 (2001).
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
164.
43 (Dec. 29, 2003)
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V.[II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1,
(describing Rodolfo Rohrmorser et al.).
165.
Id.
Aleman Lacayo Case (Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of Feb. 2,
166.
1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. E), 3 (1996)
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elected President of Nicaragua. 16 7 Protection of human rights is
directly linked to a functioning democracy. Interim measures may be
a last resort to end the attempted subversion of the democratic
process.
F. Protection to Allow Displaced Persons to Return to Their Homes
Individuals and their families who have received death threats
are sometimes forced to flee their homes or even their countries.
Human rights bodies have ordered interim measures to allow these
people to return safely. The Inter-American Commission and the
Inter-American Court have issued orders requiring States to take
measures to protect certain persons returning to the State or, when
internally displaced, to their homes within a State. In the Peace
Community of San Jose de Apartad6 case, the Court ordered
Colombia to take provisional measures to protect the residents of a
community that was being targeted for attempting to maintain its
Forty-seven of the
neutrality in the midst of civil conflict.' 68
approximately twelve hundred community members had been
murdered in a nine month period. 16 9 The Court not only ordered that
the State protect the community but also that it provide the
necessary conditions for those who had been forced to leave to be able
to return to their homes. 170 Also, in the Loayza Tamayo Case, in
which Peru had incarcerated and tortured a university professor, the
victim sought asylum in Chile when she was released from a
Peruvian prison. 171 In response to a request on her behalf, the InterAmerican Court ordered Peru to take provisional measures to
"guarantee to Mrs. Loayza Tamayo the necessary conditions of
security for her to be able to return to the country without fear of
suffering negative consequences to her physical safety, mental health
''172
and moral integrity.
In other cases, individuals have been expelled from their
countries of residence without due process. In the Haitians and

167. Aleman Lacayo Case (Nicaragua), Provisional Measures, Order of Feb. 6,
2, 3 (1997).
1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
168. Peace Community of San Jos6 de Apartad6 (Colombia), Provisional
Measures, Order of Nov. 24, 2000, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. (ser. E), 9(c) (2000), available
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
169. Id. 2.
170. Id.
16; see also Giraldo Cardona. (Colombia), Provisional Measures, Order
of Feb. 5, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 5 (1997), availableat www.corteid.or.cr.
Loayza Tamayo Case (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Feb. 3, 2001,
171.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 1(c) (2001) available at www.corteid.or.cr.
10.
172. Id.
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Dominicans of HaitianDescent in the Dominican Republic case, 173 the
Dominican Republic was accused of engaging in mass expulsions of
persons to Haiti on the basis of skin color. 174 The Court ordered the
Dominican Republic to permit the immediate return to its territory of
certain persons who had been deported to Haiti. 175 These orders are
more easily administered when the beneficiary is a single person or
family rather than a large group.
G. Medical Assistance to Prisoners
Prisoners or their family members, who have filed individual
complaints with international enforcement bodies, sometimes ask the
international organ to order that the prisoner receive needed medical
attention. One of the most common scenarios giving rise to U.N.
Human Rights Committee interim measures concerns the alleged
victim's health. 176 In an early case, the Committee ordered Uruguay
to provide medical treatment to a prisoner who had a heart
condition. 177 The State complied and subsequently reported that the
prisoner had undergone surgery. 178 In the Cesti Hurtado Case, the
Inter-American Court ratified the order of its President that Peru
take urgent measures to ensure the physical, psychological, and
moral health of the prisoner Cesti Hurtado and provide "adequate
medical treatment for his heart problems."'1 79 The Inter-American
Commission requested that Mexico take precautionary measures to
provide medical care for a seventy-one-year-old diabetic prisoner who
Mexico
was suffering the effects of inadequate treatment. 8 0
responded that the prisoner was receiving medical care at a hospital

173.
Haitians & Dominicans of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic
(Dominican Republic), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 18, 2000, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R, available at www.corteid.or.cr.
174.

Id.

175.

Id. resolution

1-2.

176.

P.R. GHANDHI,

4.
THE HUMAN

RIGHTS COMMITTEE

AND THE RIGHT OF

INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION 58 (1998). Alternately, as explained by Martin Scheinin,
a member of the Human Rights Committee and Special Rapporteur for New
Communications, the Committee may send "a note verbale to the State party [under
Rule 91] asking it to provide information; in some cases, the Committee was concerned
about a particular fact, for example the state of health of the incarcerated author of a
communication, when it would ask the State party to see to it that the person received
proper care." Summary Record of the First Part (public) of the 487th meeting, U.N.
Committee Against Torture, 27th Sess., 2, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.487 (2003).
1.4, 2,
U.N. Human Rights Committee, 15th Sess., Comm. No. 10/1977,
177.
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/10/1977 (1982) (describing Alberto Altersor v. Uruguay).
Id.
5.2.
178.
179.
Cesti Hurtado Case (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Sept. 11, 1997,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 6, availableat http://www.corteid.or.cr.
180.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1, 57 (Dec. 29, 2003)
(describing Mariano Bernal Fragoso v. Mexico).
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and that the State was studying the possibility of release from prison
because of his physical health and age. 181 Maintenance of the health
of prisoners whose cases are before international tribunals is
essential if any remedy granted by that organ is to be meaningful.

VII. COMPARATIVE PROCEDURES
The rules of each enforcement body set forth the procedures that
must be followed by the petitioner in requesting interim measures
and by the enforcement body in granting them. The Statute, Rules of
for interim
Procedure, and practice of the ICJ have served as a model
82
measures for other tribunals and enforcement bodies.'
The urgent nature of requests for interim measures mandates
that international bodies have expedited procedures to deal with
requests. The U.N. Human Rights Committee realized the need for
expedited procedures when its request that Belarus not execute a
petitioner was not issued until months after the execution had been
carried out. 183 The Committee noted
with regret that, by the time it was in a position to submit its Rule 86
The
request, the death sentence had already been carried out.
Committee understands and will ensure that cases susceptible of being
subject to Rule 86 requests will be processed with the expedition
184
necessary to enable its requests to be complied with.

In all instances, the plenary tribunal or committee is the
primary body authorized to order a State to take interim measures.
If the plenary body is not in session when the request is received,
however, a representative-usually the President, the designated
For
Rapporteur, or the other judges-may order the measures.
example, the Rules of the European Court authorize a chamber of the
Court or the Court's President to indicate interim measures. 18 5 The
Rules of the Inter-American Court specify that
[i]f the Court is not sitting, the President, in consultation with the
Permanent Commission and, if possible, with the other judges, shall
call upon the government concerned to adopt urgent measures as may

181.

Id.

182.
See Hector Gros Espiell, El Procedimiento Contencioso Ante la Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Contentious Procedure Before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights], in LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS [THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS] 67, 73, 83 (Inter.American
Institute of Human Rights, n.d.).
1.2,
183.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, 77th Sess., Comm. No. 887/1999,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/887/1999 (2003) (describing Staselovich v. Belarus).
184.
Id. 1.3.
185.
European Rules of Court, supra note 39, R. 39(1).
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be necessary to ensure the effectiveness of any provisional measures
18 6
that may be ordered by the Court at its next session.

The Rules of the Inter-American Commission, a body which also sits
only part-time, provides that its President or, if he or she is not
available, one of the Vice-Presidents, shall consult with the other
members of the Commission to make the decision. 187 The American
Convention also authorizes the Commission to request that the Court
order a State to take provisional measures even before the Court is
seised of a case. 188 The Rules of Procedure of the U.N. Committee
against Torture more broadly authorize that the Committee, a
working group of the Committee, or the Rapporteur for new
complaints and interim measures may request that the State take
steps to avoid irreparable damage to the victims. 189 If the request to
the State is not made by the plenary Committee, all Committee
members must be informed. 190 Provision for immediate consideration
of requests for interim measures is essential to their effectiveness in
saving lives.
A. PartiesAuthorized to Petition an InternationalBody to Order
Interim Measures
Interim measures can be requested unilaterally by any party to
the case .or may be ordered by the enforcement body on its own
motion. 19 1 Broad access to request interim measures is in keeping
with the understanding that few obstacles should be placed in the
path of the international body when it is called upon to order interim
measures. 192 The Rules of the European Court permit parties to the
193
case and "any other person concerned" to request such measures.
This expansion of the provision could be important when the request
is made by a witness who is not also a party to the case. The InterAmerican Court has recently expanded its Rules of Procedure to

186.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Nov. 24,
2000 partially reformed during its LXI Ordinary Period of Nov. 20-Dec. 4, 2003, art.
25(5), availableat www.corteidh.or.cr [hereinafter Rules of Procedure Inter-Am. Ct.].
187.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art.
25(2).
188.
American Convention, supra note 33, art. 63(2).
189.
Committee Against Torture, Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 108(1).
190.
Id. R. 108(3).
191.
See I.C.J. Rules of the Court, supra note 62, arts. 73-75. The beneficiaries of
interim measures are generally the individuals who are threatened. Before the ICJ,
the official beneficiary of provisional measures is the state that requested them,
although the actual beneficiary would be the individual on whose behalf the State
acted.
192.
See id. art. 74 (treating a decision on a request for interim measures as a
matter of urgency and providing that a request for provisional measures must be
accorded priority over all other cases).
193.
European Rules of Court, supra note 39, R. 39(1).
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provide that "[iun contentious cases already submitted to the Court,
the victims or alleged victims, their next of kin, or their duly
accredited representatives, may present a request for provisional
measures directly to the Court."'1 94 Parties to the case usually
request such measures when they themselves or their family
members are in danger.
Most international enforcement bodies are authorized to order
interim measures proprio motu without a formal request, thus, in
appropriate circumstances, avoiding unnecessary delays. The Rules
of the European Court of Human Rights specify that the Court may
"of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which
it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the
proper conduct of the proceedings before it."'1 95 The Rules of the ICJ
provide that the Court may indicate provisional measures proprio
motu. 1 96 The ICJ has concluded that based on this authority it is
authorized to indicate provisional measures even should one party
fail to appear before the Court. 197 The ICJ holds that "the nonappearance of one of the States concerned cannot by itself constitute
an obstacle to the indication of provisional measures." 198 In the
Inter-American system, when the case is before the Inter-American
Court, the Court is authorized to order provisional measures on its
own motion at any stage of the proceedings. 19 9 If the case is before
the Commission and has not yet been referred to the Court, the Court
may order provisional measures upon the request of the

194.
195.

Rules of Procedure Inter-Am. Ct., supra note 186, art. 25(3).
European Rules of Court, supra note 39, R. 39(1). Rule 39 states:

(1) The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a
party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the
parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the
interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it. (2).
Notice of these measures shall be given to the Committee of Ministers. (3). The
Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter connected
with the implementation of any interim measure it has indicated.
Id. R. 39.
I.C.J. Rules of the Court, supra note 62, art. 75(1). In the LaGrand Case,
196.
although Germany requested provisional measures, the ICJ stated that it ordered
provisional measures proprio motu. LaGrand Case (F.R.G v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104,
5, 22, 29 (Mar. 3).
197.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 99; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1973
I.C.J. 135, 137 (1973); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, 6
(Sept. 11); Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7, 13 (Dec. 15).
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, 6 (Sept. 11).
198.
American Convention, supra note 33, art. 63(2); Rules of Procedure Inter199.
Am. Ct., supra note 186, art. 25(1).
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Commission. 20 0 The Inter-American Commission can also, on its own
20 1
initiative, order a State to take precautionary measures.
B. PrimaFacie Jurisdiction
A court must have jurisdiction over the parties in order to rule
on a request for provisional measures. Because of the urgent nature
of a request, the ICJ does not require a full hearing that will allow it
to fully determine whether it has jurisdiction on the merits. Rather,
it will order measures when the applicant establishes a prima facie
case for jurisdiction.20 2 The ICJ has stated in this regard that
[w]hereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not,
before indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on
the merits of the case, and yet ought not to indicate such measures
unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima facie, to
afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
20 3

founded.

The U.N. Committee against Torture's Special Rapporteur for New
Communications and Interim Measures may request that a State
take interim measures even before the Committee has made a
20 4
decision on admissibility.
C. Discretionto Order Interim Measures
International enforcement organs have discretion as to whether
to order a State to take interim measures. Requests for interim
measures are granted on an ad hoc basis considering all the facts and
circumstances of each case. The European Rules of Court provide
that the Court "may . . . indicate to the parties any interim measure
which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or
of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it. ' 205 The InterAmerican Court's Rules of Procedure further support this
discretionary nature by providing that the Court may order any
provisional measures that it "deems pertinent. '20 6 Thus, the courts

200.
American Convention, supra note 33, art. 63(2); Rules of Procedure InterAm. Ct., supra note 186, art. 25(2).
201.
Rules of Procedure Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., supra note 41, art. 25(1).
202.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 99, 101, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 749,
750; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 135, 137.
203.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 99, 101, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 749,
750; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 135, 137; see also Fisheries Jurisdiction
(F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 30, 33 (Aug. 17).
204.
See Committee Against Torture, Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R.
108(1); Summary Record of the First Part (public) of the 487th meeting, U.N.
Committee Against Torture, 27th Sess., 4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.487 (2003).
205.
European Rules of Court, supra note 39, R. 39(1).
206.
Rules of Procedure Inter-Am. Ct., supra note 186, art. 25(1).
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have discretion to determine whether they will order interim
measures, and if so, what type of measures are justified in a
particular situation. The authority to grant interim measures is not
limited to those measures requested by a party. The enforcement
body may indicate measures that are partially or totally different
measures which must be taken
from those requested, or it may adopt
20 7
by the party that made the request.
International organs do not order interim measures de rigour.
The Inter-American Court has stated that this power of the Court is
"an extraordinary instrument, one which becomes necessary in
holds that exceptional
It
circumstances." 20 8
exceptional
circumstances are present when there is a prima facie situation of
grave and urgent danger. 20 9 The Inter-American Court applies a
presumption that provisional measures are called for in cases in
which the Inter-American Commission has independently requested
that the State take such measures, and the Commission-requested
measures have been ineffective. 210 The Commission's measures are
usually deemed to have been ineffective when there has been another
incident in which the beneficiaries of the measures have been further
The ICJ has also characterized 2 its
threatened or harmed. 211
12
authority to order provisional measures as an "exceptional power."
D. PriorHearing
Some controversy exists as to whether an international body
must hold a hearing to consider the views of the State before the
issuance of interim measures. Although ordering interim measures
without a prior hearing is an extraordinary procedure, international
bodies must be authorized to dispense with a hearing when there are
overwhelming and compelling reasons for so doing. Historically, the
ICJ did not order a State to take provisional measures without first

207.

I.C.J. Rules of the Court, supra note 62, art. 75(2).

At the request of a party, the Court may, at any time before the final judgment
in the case, revoke or modify any decision concerning provisional measures if,
in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or
modification. . . . [Tihe Court shall afford the parties an opportunity of
presenting their subject.

Id. art. 76(1).
208.
Chunimi Case, (Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 1, 1991,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 6(b) (1991), availableat www.corteidh.or.cr.
Digna Ochoa y Pldcido et al. (Mexico), Provisional Measures, Order of Nov.
209.
17, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 5 (1999), available at www.corteidh.or.cr.
210.
Id. 6.
See id.
211.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3, 11 (Sept. 11).
212.
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hearing the arguments of the parties. 213 If the Court was not sitting
when the request was made, it was convened to allow the parties to
present their observations. 214
Pending the oral hearing, the
President of the Court could call upon the parties to act in such a way
as would enable a potential order of provisional measures to be
effective. 215 In the LaGrand Case, however, in which the beneficiary
of the measures was to be executed on the day the ICJ ordered the
measures, the ICJ for the first time ordered provisional measures
without holding a hearing. 2 16 Judge Schwebel, in a separate opinion,
questioned whether the failure to hold a hearing was "consistent with
2' 17
the fundamental rules of the procedural equality of the parties.
Especially when courts or enforcement bodies meet on a parttime basis, irreparable damage could be done between sessions.
Moreover, it is expensive and time-consuming to immediately
convene a tribunal or enforcement body whose members reside in
different States. Therefore, some international monitoring bodies
have, when necessary, dispensed with a prior hearing or have
developed procedures whereby a hearing can take place after the
initial order of interim measures. For example, the Rules of the
Inter-American Court provide that the Court "may" hold a public
hearing but is not obligated to do so.218
Although there is a valid argument that there is no equality of
arms if the monitoring body does not hold a prior hearing to consider
a request for interim measures, the problem will only temporarily
inconvenience the State and is for the greater good of the individuals
involved in the case. Interim measures by their nature must be
ordered quickly if they are to be beneficial in most cases. A hearing
can be held after provisional measures are ordered to determine if the
measures should be revoked.
E. The Period of Effectiveness of Interim Measures
The period of effectiveness of interim measures is specific to the
facts and circumstances of each case. While the basic requirements
that led to the adoption of interim measures continue to exist, the

213.
See La Grand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104,
1 (Mar. 3) (separate
opinion of President Schwebel).
214.
I.C.J. Rules of the Court, supra note 62, art. 74(3).
215.
Id. art. 74(4). The term "equality of arms" refers to the procedural equality
of the parties.
216.
La Grand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104, 21 (Mar. 3).
217.
Id.
1 (separate opinion of President Schwebel); see also Michael K. Addo,
Interim Measures of Protection for Rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 713, 718-20 (1999) ("The principle of equality of arms is
an inherent part of the right to a fair hearing in any litigation, including incidental
proceedings before the ICJ.").
218.
Rules of Procedure Inter-Am. Ct., supranote 186, art 25(7).
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measures must be maintained in effect.2 19 The international body
may extend its orders of interim measures when the threat continues
to be grave and urgent. The situation calling for interim measures
may last for years and, thus, require repeated extensions of interim
measures. An example is the Colotenangocase in the Inter-American
system in which the Inter-American Court initially ordered
provisional measures in 1994 to protect persons who had witnessed
an attack by Guatemalan civil patrols against unarmed participants
in a human rights demonstration. 220 The measures were periodically
expanded to cover the relatives and attorneys of those witnesses who
were also at risk. 221 The provisional measures were in effect for over
222
seven years.
Orders of interim measures are made for a set period of time. If,
during that period or at its conclusion, the international body is
convinced that the requirements of extreme gravity and urgency no
longer exist, it will lift or refuse to renew the measures. 223 In this
regard, the Rules of the ICJ provide that upon a party's request for
the revocation or modification of provisional measures, the Court will
consider the observations of the parties before determining whether a
change in the situation justifies the requested revocation or
modification of the measures.2 2 4
Although the rules of some
international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies do not address the
termination of interim measure, their jurisprudence may establish
the principle. It is in the interest of judicial efficiency that measures
that are no longer necessary be withdrawn. Moreover, States are
more likely to comply with Court-ordered provisional measures if
those measures are terminated when they are no longer warranted.
A court or tribunal will lift interim measures when the
circumstances that resulted in the adoption of measures no longer
exist or are found never to have existed. In Einhorn v. France, the
European Court lifted its order to France to delay the extradition of

219.
Constitutional Court (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Mar. 14, 2001,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 3 (2001), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr (n.d.).
220.
Colotenango (Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of June 24, 1994, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 3, operative 1 (1994), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
221.
Colotenango (Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Orders of Dec. 1, 1994,
Sept. 19, 1997, Feb. 2, 2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr (expanding interim protection to Mrs. Francisca SalesMartin).
222.
See Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, InterAm. Ct. H.R., OEAJSer.L/V/III.54, doc. 4,
42 (Feb. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
223.
Committee against Torture, Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 108(6)(7). Rules 108(6) and (7) provide that "[t]he State party may inform the Committee
that the reasons for the interim measures have lapsed or present argument why the
request for interim measures should be lifted. The Rapporteur, the Committee or the
Working Group may withdraw the request for interim measures." Id.
224.
I.C.J. Rules of the Court, supra note 62, art. 76.
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Einhorn to the United States upon the assurance that he would
receive a new trial in the U.S. and that he would not be subject to the
death penalty. 225 In Shamayev and 12 Others v. Georgia and Russia,
the European Court was persuaded by assurances of the authorities
of Georgia and Russia that when the Chechen prisoners were
extradited to Russia they would be guaranteed unhindered access to
medical treatment, legal counsel, and the European Court. 226 The
Court, therefore, refused to renew the measures that had required a
227
delay of extradition.
The Inter-American Court has lifted provisional measures in a
range of circumstances. It lifted provisional measures in the Ivcher
Bronstein Case subsequent to Peru's cancellation of arrest warrants,
annulment of court proceedings against the victim, and restoration of
the alleged victim's Peruvian nationality and shareholder status in a
television station. 228 In the Sudrez Rosero case against Ecuador, the
urgent measures initially ordered by the Court's President were lifted
by the plenary Court when the beneficiary of the measures was
released from prison. 229 In the Vogt case, the Court lifted provisional
measures protecting a priest in Guatemala because the threat and
other acts of harassment had abated and the priest was able to
conduct his pastoral activities unhindered. 23 0 In some instances,
provisional measures will be lifted for one or more beneficiaries who
declare that they are no longer in need of protection, while they are
23 1
maintained for the other beneficiaries of the measures.

225.
Einhorn v. France, App. No. 71555/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001),
9-10, 26,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng.
226.
Shamayev & 12 Others v. Georgia & Russia, App. No. 36378/02 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2003), availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/eng.
227.
Id.
228.
Ivcher Bronstein Case (Peru), Provisional Measures, Order of Mar. 14,
2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 4 (2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
229.
Sudrez Rosero Case (Ecuador), Provisional Measures, Order of June 28,
1996, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
2, res. (1996), available at http://www.corteidh.
or.cr.
230.
Vogt Case (Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 11, 1997,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
4 (1997), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr (quoting
the Commission's brief of October 27, 1997); see also Serech & Saquic Case
(Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of Sept. 19, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. (ser.
E), 4, res. 1 (1997), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr (provisional measures lifted
because harassment of protected persons abated);
Cesti Hurtado Case (Peru)
Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 14, 2000, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
8-9, res. 1
(2000), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr (provisional measures lifted because
individual was released from prison); Paniagua Morales et al. & VAsquez et al.
(Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 27, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E)
(1998), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
231.
See Giraldo Cardona Case (Colombia), Provisional Measures, Order of June
19, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
2, res. 1 (1998), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr (Court lifted provisional measures for two protected persons
because one stated that he had received no threats and the other stated that she was
out of the country); see also Caballero Delgado & Santana Case (Colombia), Provisional
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The conclusion of a case will not necessarily result in the lifting
of interim measures when the victims and witnesses are still in
danger. For example, after the Inter-American Court issued its
judgment on reparations in the CaballeroDelgado and Santana Case,
232
it lifted the provisional measures ordered to protect the witnesses.
Only days later, the beneficiaries of the measures petitioned the
Court to reinstate them at least until the domestic proceedings and
investigations ended. 233 All parties involved, including the
Commission and the State, concurred that the measures should be
reinstated, and the Court complied. 234 Witnesses in cases before
human rights organs may continue to be targeted long after the case
has been closed.
The enforcement body may refuse to lift provisional measures
when it cannot be verified that the situation that precipitated the
request has improved. In the Clemente Teherdn et al. Case, the InterAmerican Commission lost contact with the members of the
indigenous community in Colombia that had initially reported the
human rights violations. 23 5 After a prolonged period, the Commission
and the State asked the Inter-American Court to terminate the
provisional measures. 236 The Court refused the request, stating that
it did not have sufficient information that the situation that had
23 7
triggered the initial order of provisional measures had ceased.
Therefore, the Court stated that "the lifting of the provisional
measures is not justified. '23 8 A refusal to lift the measures when the
petitioners fail to communicate may minimize State attempts to
intimidate petitioners into abandoning their petitions. Conversely, if,
as it appears, interim measure requests continue to increase and the
duration of provisional measure orders extends for several years, the
burden on the enforcement organs, each with a limited staff,
threatens to overwhelm human rights systems.

4, res. 1 (1999),
Measures, Order of June 3, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr (provisional measures lifted for two protected
persons because neither had received any threats).
232.
Caballero Delgado & Santana Case (Colombia), Provisional Measures,
Order of Jan. 31, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), T 1-2, res. 1 (1997), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
233.
Caballero Delgado & Santana Case (Colombia), Provisional Measures,
Order of Apr. 16, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 99 4-6 (1997), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
234.
Id. res. 1.
Clemente TeherAn et al. Case (Colombia), Provisional Measures, Order of
235.
3 (1998), available at
June 19, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. E),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
236.
Clemente Teherdn et al. Case (Colombia), Provisional Measures, Order of
Aug. 12, 2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), TT 3, 11 (2000), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
Id. 7.
237.
238.
Id.
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OVERSIGHT OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERIM MEASURES

The court or other enforcement body that orders a State to
take interim measures will normally oversee State compliance. 239 In
doing so, it may require that the State and beneficiaries periodically
provide information on the effects of the measures taken by the State.
In the alternative, the court or enforcement body may request
information on the effectiveness of the measures. To this end, the
Rules of the ICJ provide that the Court may request relevant
information from the parties on any aspect of the implementation of
the provisional measures it has ordered. 240 Likewise, the European
Court "may request information from the parties on any matter
connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has
indicated. '' 24 1 Even after the measures are lifted, the situation may
require periodic oversight. When the Inter-American Commission
petitions the Inter-American Court to lift provisional measures, it
generally volunteers to continue to oversee the situation for any
future problems. 24 2 Monitoring the effects of interim measures
protects the beneficiaries and allows the monitoring body to fine tune
both the measures in that case and those that it will order in future
cases, so that they will be most effective.
When a State fails to comply with an order of interim measures,
some international systems provide for recourse to a political organ.
In the United Nations system, any measures indicated by the ICJ
must be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for transmission to the Security Council. 243 The Secretary
General also maintains a list of the U.N. Committee against Torture's
requests for interim measures. 244 In the European system, notice
that the Court has indicated interim measures is given to the
Committee of Ministers. 24 5 Under the European human rights
system, the Committee of Ministers follows up decisions of the Court

See Committee Against Torture, Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R.
239.
108(5) (requiring the CAT Rapporteur for new complaints and interim measures to
monitor compliance with the Committee's requests to States). The Inter-American
Court generally requests that the Inter-American Commission monitor compliance and
report periodically to the Court. See Digna Ochoa y Pldcido et al. Case (Mexico)
Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 17, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), operative 5
(1999), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr; Aleman Lacayo Case (Nicaragua),
Provisional Measures, Order of Feb. 6, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), operative 3
(1997), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
240.
I.C.J. Rules of the Court, supra note 62, art. 78.
European Rules of Court, supra note 39, R. 39(3).
241.
242.
Serech & Saquic Case (Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of Sept.
6 (1997), available at
19, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R. (ser. E),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
243.
I.C.J. Rules of the Court, supra note 62, art. 77.
244.
Committee against Torture, Rules of Procedure, supra note 28, R. 108(4).
245.
European Rules of Court, supra note 39, R. 39(2).
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to ensure State compliance. The Inter-American Court includes a
statement in its annual report to the OAS General Assembly
concerning the provisional measures it has ordered in the preceding
year and its recommendations as to the appropriate action to be
46
taken when the State has failed to implement the measures.'
Recourse to the OAS General Assembly has not been particularly
useful to date because the General Assembly has not had the political
will to sanction a State that has not complied with Court-ordered
provisional measures. Most recently, the Inter-American Court also
has posted information regarding State compliance with provisional
measures on its website.

IX. STATE COMPLIANCE WITH INTERIM MEASURES

State compliance with internationally ordered interim measures
varies depending on the type of case, the international body that
ordered them, and the State that is subject to the order. States have
complied most consistently with interim measures to delay
extradition or to protect individuals who have been threatened. Most
European Court-ordered interim measures have involved orders to
delay extradition or deportation to States where the person could be
subject to torture or the death penalty. 247 With certain notable
exceptions, European States have complied and delayed the
extradition or deportation until the case has been resolved in the
European human rights system.
State compliance with interim measure orders is sometimes
quickly forthcoming. On December 17, 2003, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights requested that the State of Paraguay
take measures to protect the patients at the state neuro-psychiatric
Reliable information submitted to the Commission
hospital.
described the sanitary and security conditions in which the patients
lived to be inhuman and degrading; female patients had been raped,
children were confined with adults, youths were kept naked in
solitary confinement for years without access to bathrooms, and often
The
there was no medical diagnosis of patient conditions. 248
Commission asked the Paraguayan authorities to take precautionary

246.
Rules of Procedure Inter-Am. Ct., supra note 186, art. 25(8).
247.
See Jo M. Pasqualucci, ProvisionalMeasures in the Inter-American Human
Rights System: An Innovative Development in International Law, 26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 803, 820 (1993) (citing Carl A. Norgaard & Hans Christian Kruger,
Interim and Conservatory Measures Under the European System of Protection of
Human Rights, in PROGRESS IN THE SPIRIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 112 (1988)).
Case 60, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 14, OEA/ser. L./V.II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, CH III,
248.
§ CA, 60 (2003) (describing Jorge Bernal, Julio Cezar Rotely and the patients at the
Hospital Neursiquidfrico).
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measures to protect the mental and physical health of the patients
and to establish conditions that complied with international
standards. 249 In response to the Commission's request, the President
of Paraguay and the Minister of Public Health and Social Welfare
visited the hospital two weeks later on December 31.250 Following
their visit, the director of the hospital was replaced, and an audit and
other actions were taken to improve the living conditions of the
251
patients.
States may take action to correct a problem before a public
hearing on a request for interim measures is held. A positive
example arose in the Gallardo Rodriguez Case in which a Mexican
general who had criticized abuses of power in the Mexican army had
been imprisoned for several years. 252
The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention had studied the case and had declared
his detention to be illegal. 253 The President of the Inter-American
Court, in conjunction with the other judges, ordered urgent measures
to protect General Gallardo Rodriguez and called for a public hearing
to be held before the plenary Court. Mexico released the long-time
254
prisoner before the hearing took place.
Another impressive instance of government compliance in the
Inter-American system occurred at the public hearing on provisional
measures in the Chunimd Case.2 55
Several members of a
Guatemalan highland indigenous human rights group had been
murdered, but the alleged perpetrators who had bragged about the
killings remained free. 256 At the public hearing on provisional
measures before the Inter-American Court, the Guatemalan
government made the surprising announcement that it had arrested
the civil patrol leaders, who were allegedly responsible for the
257
assassinations.
Although it is difficult to prove that persons were not harmed
because a government complied with interim measures ordered for
their protection, it is interesting to note the occurrences in the
Honduran Disappearance Cases. When two witnesses who had

249.
Id.
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
252.
Gallardo Rodriguez Case (Mexico), Urgent Measures, Resolution of
President of Feb. 14, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 1.
253.
Id.
254.
See Jorge G. Castafieda, Statements During The Joint Conference With
The Secretary of The Interior in Mexico City (Feb. 7, 2002).
255.
Chunimi Case, (Guatemala), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 1, 1991,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (1991), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr
256.
Id.
1.
257.
Id.
8.
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258
appeared before the Inter-American Court received death threats,
the President of the Court requested that the government of
Honduras protect those particular witnesses. The government duly
informed the Court that it would guarantee their safety as
requested. 25 9 Although those named witnesses were not harmed,
three other witnesses who had appeared before the Court or who were
26 0
scheduled to give evidence were subsequently murdered.
Compliance with ICJ orders of provisional measures has not
been uniform. In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), the Court granted Nicaragua's request for provisional
measures to prevent the United States from continuing to mine
Nicaraguan harbours. 261 The United States did not comply with the
request for provisional measures. In the Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the ICJ granted the
United States request for provisional measures to effect the release of
the hostages during the Iranian crisis. 26 2 Iran did not comply with
the Court order. A State that does not comply with requests that it
take interim measures may risk acquiring the reputation of being a
rogue state or a State that considers itself above international law.
In general, States have complied with interim measures
requested by the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the U.N.
Committee against Torture. 263 State parties had complied with more
than 100 requests for an interim measures formulated by the U.N.
Human Rights Committee before Trinidad and Tobago ignored its
264
order and executed the beneficiary of an interim measures request.
A Committee member of the U.N. Committee against Torture
suggested to the plenary committee, however, that action be taken to
combat the "increasing tendency of States to disregard its requests for
'26 5
interim measures during the consideration of cases.

258.
Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits), Judgment of July 29, 1988,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4,
45 (1988), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr
(discussing two witnesses before the Inter-American Court who had received threats).
259.
Id.
260.
Id.
40-41.
261.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 500 (May 1984).
262.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
Request for Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Dec. 15).
263.
Summary Record of the First Part (public) of the 487th meeting, U.N.
Committee Against Torture, 27th Sess., 5 U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.487 (2003).
264.
Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, U.N.
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1352 (1996).
265.
Summary Record of the 435th meeting, U.N. Committee Against Torture,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.435 (2000) (noting that El Masry suggested that the States'
disregard of the Committee's request was because interim measures are provided for
only in the Committee's Rules of Procedure and not in the Convention and, thus, were
not binding on the States).
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The most common circumstance in which States have failed to
comply is when a tribunal issues a measure mandating the delay of
the death penalty while the case is being considered by the
international forum. In general, the United States and certain
Caribbean nations have ignored interim orders in death penalty
cases. Trinidad and Tobago executed two prisoners who were covered
by Inter-American Court-ordered provisional measures. 266 The State
did not, however, execute the other beneficiaries of the measures.
The United States has not complied with interim measures ordering
cases could be studied by
it to halt executions of prisoners until their2 67
the ICJ or the Inter-American Commission.

X. CONCLUSION

Interim measures are particularly important in international
human rights cases in that they provide for the protection of persons
who are in imminent danger of irreparable harm. Those persons may
be at risk because they are judges who have ruled against the
government, human rights activists who are bringing to light
governmental human rights abuses, opposition party leaders,
prisoners in need of medical care, persons facing the death penalty
who allege that their right to due process was violated, or those who
petition for international human rights relief- including their
families, attorneys, and witnesses to the case. An international
tribunal or enforcement body can order a State as interim measures
to take action to protect the persons at risk.
The major international tribunals have harmonized the status of
interim measures by declaring that their orders of interim measures
are binding on States regardless of whether the authority to order the
measures is expressly set forth in the constituent document or is
provided for in the self-drafted rules of procedure. Quasi-judicial
organs such as the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the U.N.
Committee against Torture, and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights have stated that compliance with their orders of

James et al. (Trinidad and Tobago), Provisional Measures, Order of Aug.
266.
4, 12 (2000). The order required that the State
16, 2000, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E),
"take all measures to preserve [their] lives" "so as not to hinder the processing of their
cases before the Inter-American system." Id.
34 (Merits)
See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466,
267.
(Judgment June 27); Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human
62
Rights 2003, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V.JII.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. III, § C.1,
(Dec. 29, 2003) (describing Larry Eugene Moon v. United States); Annual Report of the
C.H.R.,
Inter-Am.
Rights 2003,
on Human
Commission
Inter-American
63 (Dec. 29, 2003) (describing John
OEA/ser.L.IV./II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, ch. 1II, § CA,
Elliot v. United States). Both these prisoners were executed despite the order of
precautionary measures.

20051

INTERIM MEASURESIN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

49

interim measures is essential to the individual petition process, and
therefore, failure to comply is a separate violation of the relevant
treaty. States have not, however, necessarily accepted that interim
measures ordered by quasi-judicial human rights bodies are binding.
Interim measures must be considered to be binding when issued
by both international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The right of
individuals to petition international enforcement organs is a
revolutionary step in international human rights law. When States
accept the competence of an international enforcement organ to
consider individual petitions, they commit themselves to support the
petition procedure. The de jure right to petition international bodies
must not be nullified by the State's de facto act or failure to act. The
right to individual petition is a nullity if the participants in the
proceedings have died or can be intimidated into withdrawing a
complaint. A State that has accepted the right of individual petition
by ratifying the constituent instrument or that has filed a separate
declaration of acceptance of competence has bound itself to support
that process by complying with any interim measures ordered. It
would be incompatible with the obligations voluntarily undertaken by
the State for the State to act or refrain from acting in a way that
2 68
frustrates the consideration of an individual petition.

268.
869/1999,

See Piandiong et al. v. Philippines, Judgment of Oct. 19, 2000, Comm. No.
5.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70JD/869/1999.

